Mitsubishi Jet facing cancellations


In 2009 CM argued (in a former life) that the Mitsubishi Regional Jet (MRJ) was doomed to failure. It was answering a question that no one was asking. It seems that one of its customers, Eastern Airlines, which originally placed 40 orders found itself in receivership and its new owners do not seem to have any intention honouring Eastern’s order book. With a total order book (including options) of 447 MRJ aircraft, this would be a big dent. The plane has been beset with delays, material changes (it was to have carbon composite wings but it was deemed too expensive so switched back to alloys, increasing weight hence hurting economics) and the realities of the industry.

1. Demand – Both Boeing & Airbus publish detailed long range fleet forecasts every year. They are both in agreement that regional jets (50-100 seats) have little future forecasting they’ll represent a total of 3,000 orders in the next two decades. Around 8 years ago that forecast was 5,000.

2. Incumbents – Embraer and Bombardier dominate the regional jet market with some 80% share. Mitsubishi is looking to beat the door down in an industry where risk is not wanted. The Chinese are entering the market with the C-919 and the Russians with the Sukhoi Superjet. Mitsubishi wanted a 20% share. Of 5,000 units that’s 1000 units they banked on. At 3,000 that’s only 600 units their share target would hit. Boeing and Airbus are offering slightly smaller versions of the 737 and A320 series to cater to the market that would normally buy an RJ.

3. Pilots – well most pilots are certified to fly only one type of commercial plane at any given time so Mitsubishi needs to make sure it’s planes can have a supply of pilots to fly them and airlines need to take a bet on expansion. Same goes for ground crew training.

4. Existing fleet – if a regional airline wanted to expand, if they used Embraer ERJ-145s it is better to get more of the same as the economics are well understood. Also the pool of pilots is likely more accessible. Route gaps need to be filed as soon as possible so waiting 12 months to get an MRJ may not work for an airline.

5. Residual values – when airlines get into financial turbulence, sometimes fleets need to be trimmed. Having a ‘liquid’ fleet which is easily placed at another airline helps balance sheet (relatively speaking). The best example was the GE engined 747 (60% of market) which sold at a premium to the Rolls-Royce engined 747 (15% of  market) in the used market because very few airlines used RR. A fleet of MRJs may have few homes to go if airlines need to part with them quickly. Airlines know this so it is likely that Mitsubishi is providing such residual value guarantees to bank in the orders.

However if Mitsubishi keep losing orders then the airlines that intend to use them may switch away on the basis that the risks down the line are too great. Regional airline budgets are thin. Risks are avoided at all costs.

The MRJ will likely fall foul of the Mitsubishi YS-11 of the 1970s. Great concept but poor execution on the basis of not having a big enough grasp of the industry dynamics. JAL and ANA will likely he asked to do national service on top of the initial tour of duty to support the plane.

The ground’s the limit.